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| 261. It also set up a worker-management committee and a grievance committee. Wages and allowances were to be increased after one year, and the union consulted over productivity. | 261. Will the union allow them to change the machines back so that they can be productive, or will that be seen as a speed up? |
| 262. "This fight" said Rosario Mejia, general secretary of the Bonahan union "was one of the greatest experiences of my life." | 262. The real question will be where this firm is in five years, productive or out of business. The victory will not seem so sweet if the firm is bankrupt. |
| 2. At the international level | |
| 263. The success of campaigns for better working conditions with EPZ enterprises depends largely on the courage of the local organisers, but as the zones operate in an international context, there must also be a response at this level. This is where international solidarity comes into play, and the setting up of a coordinating strategy among all the trade union organisations concerned. | 263. Since ICFTU has failed to link EPZs to the troubles of workers or unions, it is rather patronizing for it now to prescribe that it will organize internationally to protect workers from EPZs -- by linking its present system of trade union organizations worldwide to the "fight". |
| 264. Coordination at the regional level is an essential step. The desire to form a common front to face up to the "swallow" companies led to a special meeting in February 1994 of the ICFTU's regional organisation for the Americas, ORIT. The participants, trade unionists from Central America, the Dominican Republic, and Mexico, promised to develop their capacity to monitor the multinational enterprises in the region. | 264. Nevertheless, the EPZs must beware. Because an
organization with as many countries and workers and connections as ICFTU says
it has can make a demon (a "cause celebre") out of the EPZ.
The very success of EPZs worldwide will make it difficult for them to defend themselves. Since they are popular, they are in the same position as the "dream-seller" companies like Nike and Liz Claiborne, which are popular also. They have earned a public position and thereby make it easy for willful, reckless, untruthful and immoral attackers to use their name to gain attention for themselves. Monitoring the multinational enterprises in the region seems particularly pointless since the ICFTU has amply demonstrated that the worst abuses are in the locally controlled firms. |
| 265. The victory scored by workers at the Bibong factory in the Dominican Republic gives an interesting example of how unions can react. What were the ingredients of their success? The activism of the workers, their courage, the trade union training they had received, were of course decisive factors. But, notes the AIFLD, the international dimension of the struggle played a decisive role. A multinational trade union campaign was set up to support the efforts of the Bibong workers, with the participation of trade union organisations from North America (AIFLD, American Institute for Free Labour Development, ILGWU, International Ladies Garment Workers' Union), Latin America (InterAmerican textile workers' Union FITTVCCORI) and Europe (International textile workers' federation). Throughout the dispute, these organisations exchanged information and coordinated their action through a consultative committee. | 265. This means that by their very success EPZs are attracting
ICFTU to assemble its Gang of 5 - itself, plus environmentalists/ religious
agenda promoters/ "consumer advocates"/ and anti-immigrant xenophobes to
finance media cacophony against EPZs.
Right or wrong doesn't matter to them. Watch out, everybody! Look at the list on the left, which concentrated on a single factory in the Dominican Republic. And that was just inside the ICFTU -- didn't even involve the rest of the Gang of 5. And EPZs whether they are right or wrong are the next major target. The battle will be fought in political centers around the world as well as in factories. It will be the last thrashing of the dying dragon of monopolistic unionism against the workers of the world. Watch out that the tail doesn't get you! |
| Solidarity | |
| 266. Demands for better working conditions in the factories of the Third World are not, as its detractors claim, protectionism in disguise. The example of the battle fought by the workers at the Bibong enterprise in El Salvador is proof of this. It also shows how governments who have been complicit in trade union rights violations can bow to external pressure. In April 1994, Aurelia Cruz, the elected leader of the 500 workers at the Bibong Apparel Corporation in Bonoa, was arrested at the plant by the police on charges of "defamation". The company also dismissed her. She had criticised the company during a radio broadcast. The previous month, she had traveled to the US to testify on workers' rights abuses at hearings of the US Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) SubCommittee. | 266. Another stirring war story, and the ICFTU while using
words like "victory", "battle fought", object to enterprises thinking it is at
war? They even have a sovereign government "bow" before their pressure. No
wonder governments want to keep them weak.
Aurelia Cruz is a Pro. |
| 267. The hearings were to determine whether the Dominican Republic's eligibility for preferential trade access to the US should be withdrawn because of its violations of workers' rights. The government, fearing a suspension of trade privileges by the US, began to enforce its labour laws and took the unprecedented step of suspending Bibong's export licence on 26 April. The licence was reinstated in May after Bibong agreed to abide by the law. Aurelia Cruz was reinstated. The charges against her were dismissed, and the police officers were reprimanded for improper conduct. On 22 July, workers at Bibong achieved the first ever collective bargaining contract in the 25-year history of the zones. Under pressure from the government, the company agreed to recognise the union, and a grievance procedure was established to resolve conflicts over treatment by supervisors. The government pledged that it would continue to suspend the export licence of companies which broke the law." -- Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights, ICFTU, 1995. | 267. Clearly this is a battle between the unions and a single firm. EPZs are not at all discussed or implicated. |
| 268. The trade unions also put pressure on Bibong's client companies in the United States. Some of the companies suspended their buying contracts and threatened to cancel orders if the abuses continued. The Dominican government, worried about the request by the AFL-CIO to withdraw its privileges under the Generalized System of Preferences and the Caribbean basin initiative, was forced to exert increasing pressure on the firm to respect the workers' right to unionise. | 268. ICFTU showed its strength in this case by having the
AFL-CIO put political pressure on the US President who authorizes GSP
extensions on some 3000 product groups to poor countries each year.
The ICFTU is proud that it was willing to crush the jobs and hopes of 180,000 direct workers and another 360,000 indirect workers in the Dominican Republic in a dispute with one company about the treatment of 500 workers. The jobs put at risk, by their type of calculation, are responsible for supporting 1/3 of the Dominican population. We can think of nothing that this so clearly shows as ICFTU's blind selfish motives and its contempt for the worker of the world. |
| 269. More and more agreements and conventions include measures and safety clauses to protect workers' rights. The Generalized System of Preferences foresees fines or sanctions against countries which do not take steps to ensure that certain minimum labour rights are respected. The US trade unions for example are able to call on the US Trade Representative and ask that a particular country be "put to the test". This was the case for Guatemala in 1992. | 269. The purpose of the GSP is to aid in the industrial
development of poor countries. It may allow sanctions, but if sanctions become
its reason for being, it is of little value to either the rich or poor nations.
It is also another bad precedent of extra-territorial law, and the
sanctimonious imposition of US standards on other countries.
In 1995 the USA imported a total of $18 Billion from all developing countries under GSP -- out of total imports of $744 Billion. Of the $18 Billion, the US imported $41 million from Guatemala down from $70 million in 1992. The Gang of 5 would like to impose all kinds of sanctions against Guatemala to prove its various theories. Poor Guatemala! |
| 270. Other countries also have a GSP. In 1995, the European Union included in its system conditions aimed at withdrawing preferences from countries that used forced labour. | 270. "Forced labor" means "convicts" or "persons in jail" or "slaves" who are made to work at production of goods for no pay. The USA has been against this practice for many years and has forbidden imports of such goods from anywhere. EPZs are not involved in such practices. |
| 3. The Social Clause | |
| 271. The struggle at the shopfloor level, although vitally important, cannot provide the solution to what is a global problem. The question therefore is: should and if yes, then how the respect of internationally recognised fundamental workers' rights be linked to the process of trade liberalisation such as is taking place within the WTO? Should, in other words, a "social clause" be imposed on international trade relations to prevent a company or an enterprise being able to enjoy a comparative advantage through the violation of workers rights? | 271. Talk about "fox in the hen house" (see ICFTU paragraph 17)
the reason the union-led Gang of 5 (unions/ environmentalists/ religious agenda
promoters/ "consumer advocates"/ and anti-immigrant xenophobes) has clustered
together is that each member, for its own agenda, wants a "social clause" to
impose strong economic penalties through international trade law and practice
on what it doesn't like. Fortunately all such proposals in the 21st Century
have been stopped cold (except the labor and environmental dictates appended to
the NAFTA agreement among the US/ Canada/ Mexico which might offer some excuse
due to proximity of the parties).
They were stopped cold once again at the WTO Conference in Singapore in December 1996. The developing countries, led by India, sent ICFTU a strong message: it will not be allowed to use the DSS sanctions of the WTO to impose its views on the developing world. The WTO Dispute Settlement System (DSS) is generally agreed to be one of the few multi-lateral mechanisms with any real teeth. These are the first strong sanctions ever available to a world trade organization -- and are one of the main reasons for creation of the WTO. But the sanctions deal with TRADE -- not unions, not the environment, not religious conviction, not "consumer advocacy", not immigration. And they will not be used for these matters. Since we have seen in this article that the ICFTU is in fact opposed to a liberal free trade system, an attempt to add a "social clause" could well be an attempt to destroy the WTO altogether. |
| 272. The idea of a "social clause" is nothing new. It already existed at the end of the First World War when the British delegation spoke, without success, of sanctioning countries which practiced disloyal competition through the exploitation of the workforce. It was also mentioned, in 1948, in a clause in the Havana Charter which established the GATT. The clause states that "the members recognise that every country has a common interest in achieving and maintaining correct labour standards in relation to productivity, and therefore in improving wages and working conditions to the extent that productivity so permits". This Charter was never ratified however, and this important aspect has remained absent from international trade agreements. | 272. For centuries the world was thought to be flat, and the earth the center of the universe. Just because an idea is around for a long time does not make it correct. There must have been a reason the social clause was never adopted. |
| 273. During the Uruguay Round negotiations of the GATT at the beginning of the eighties, the ICFTU relaunched the idea of a "social clause" based on the respect of the ILO's international standards. The aim is not to impose wages and working conditions applicable across the globe, but rather to ensure the respect of fundamental workers' rights and to prevent repression, exploitation and discrimination. | 273. The ILO is established by governments to address these specific issues. Many of its standards have been adopted into law by their member governments. There is no need to burden the WTO trade organization, established by many of the same governments, with an enforcement task over rules they have not established. In fact it is bad policy. |
| 274. The most important of the ILO standards are ILO Conventions 87 and 98 on the freedom of association and collective bargaining, Conventions 29 and 105 on the abolition of forced labour, Conventions 111 and 100 on discrimination in employment and equal pay for work of equal value, and Convention 138 on the minimum working age (child labour). | 274. If the governments of the world want there to be international dispute mechanisms to look at compliance with these accords, it should be done at the ILO, and not the WTO. The WTO lacks the jurisdiction and the expertise. |
| 275. "These are not industrialised country standards" notes the ICFTU "they are standards that are global in their applicability". | 275. This claim is of course open to different interpretation by more objective observers. We do note that the board of the ICFTU is nearly half European and North American despite the fact that only 10% of the world's population is in those areas. |
| 276. "Universal respect of these seven key ILO conventions" writes the ICFTU "would prevent the most extreme forms of exploitation and fierce competition. It would not put an end to the comparative advantages of the developing countries but it would establish a process whereby working conditions can be steadily improved as trade develops, in particular by concentrating on an improvement in productivity." | 276. It should not need to be pointed out again that this agenda is an intergovernmental problem, and the EPZs are not even an issue. |
| 277. "In the medium and long term, the universal application of fundamental international labour standards would contribute to a more balanced expansion of world trade and a more flexible process of adjustment to the changes in the world division of labour". | 277. Let management handle it. |
| 278. Contrary to what its critics would have us believe, the social clause may prove to be the best antidote to increasing protectionism. Far from being a new obstacle to trade, the social clause would serve to protect the developing countries' access to world export markets. It would also enable them to develop their international competitiveness on the basis of improved productivity rather than on falling wages and deteriorating working conditions. It would protect them from the blackmail of certain multinational companies who play on their ability to find governments ready to violate workers' fundamental rights. | 278. There is a sinister threat in the ICFTU saying that "the
social clause would serve to protect the developing countries' access to world
export markets."
The threat is to assemble the Gang of 5 into a more effective and better financed obstacle to market access than it is now:
From the recent record, the union attacks on freedom to trade do not exhibit an innate proclivity to help developing countries access the market of the USA or European Union. On the contrary the ICFTU threatens to block access to world export markets in the same way that unions have behaved for the past 30 years, such as:
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| 279. In short, the ICFTU suggest that a WTO/ILO consultative body be set up to be responsible for the application of the social clause. It would examine, at regular intervals or on the basis of well documented complaints, the respect by the countries in question, in law and in practice, of the principles contained in the seven key international conventions on workers' rights. In the event of violations, clear, progressive and foreseeable measures may be applied to the country concerned. | 279. This modest proposal, of course, removes the messy requirement of the ILO that the conventions have to be ratified into law by each country. It modestly creates an unelected labor legislator for the world. It modestly creates an unelected international judiciary to impose sanctions. Remember that this modest proposal is by an organization that makes it clear that in its eyes the "right to organize" means the "right to organize into trade unions acceptable to itself". IT IS NOT A MODEST PROPOSAL. Indeed it is a proposal that the developing and developed world rejected when it established the ILO and the WTO. And that all countries rejected quickly, except the United States which has not ratified most of the ILO conventions, and France where trade unions are also owed a favor by government. |
| The ILO and Export Processing Zones | |
| 280. The ILO is preparing a special study on the export processing zones which is due to be published in the 1996 edition of the World Labour Report. The 1996-1997 budget foresees a special programme on EPZs including a survey of EPZs worldwide looking at health and safety, industrial relations, their economic impact, and women workers. The report would be submitted to a tripartite meeting to be attended by 15 to 20 countries that host EPZs. The ILO hopes this meeting will result in a set of guidelines or a code of conduct that could serve as a manual to improve relations between workers and employers in the EPZs. Financial difficulties however may mean that this programme cannot be continued after next year. | 280. The ILO study was delayed one year. The team went into
the field late in 1996. It went armed with the support of the World Export
Processing Zones Association (WEPZA) which agreed to encourage its 41 members
to receive the ILO team under the following conditions:
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